

Supplementary Online Content

Petersen LA, Simpson K, Pietz K, et al. Effects of individual physician-level and practice-level financial incentives on hypertension care: a randomized trial. *JAMA*. doi:10.1001/jama.2013.276303.

eTable. Longitudinal modeling results of the effect of the intervention on implementing antihypertensive medication change

This supplementary material has been provided by the authors to give readers additional information about their work.

eTable. Longitudinal Modeling Results of the Effect of the Intervention on Implementing Antihypertensive Medication Change^a

Clinical Measure	Study Group	Estimated Change in the Percentage of Physicians' Patients Meeting the Measure (95% Bootstrap CI)	Estimated Difference in the Change Between Each Incentive Group and Control Group (95% Bootstrap CI)	P Value for Estimated Difference^b
Any antihypertensive medication change ^c				
	Individual incentives	10.94 (2.19, 22.64)	15.36 (0.20, 28.41)	.05
	Practice incentives	6.05 (-1.34, 15.90)	10.46 (-2.48, 22.14)	.18
	Combined incentives	10.39 (2.64, 21.55)	14.80 (0.00, 27.11)	.07
	Control (no incentives)	-4.42 (-10.89, 8.07)	Reference	

Abbreviation: CI, confidence interval

^aChange defined as either a physician starting the patient on a antihypertensive medication, adding a medication to the patient's existing regimen, or making a dose adjustment.

^bP values compare the change in the control group with the change in each incentive intervention group.

^cModel adjusted for ceiling effects and whether physician is white.